Alto Litigation Supports Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights

Giving back to our communities and causes we care about is core to our mission at Alto Litigation. We’re therefore proud to share that we recently supported the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area’s (LCCRSF) Annual Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. awards dinner as a Visionary sponsor.

The LCCRSF is a longstanding civil rights institution on the West Coast that does important work to build an equitable and just society. The Annual Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. awards dinner is an opportunity to celebrate the success of LCCRSF and our pro bono community partners in solving intractable local problems with national significance around racial, economic and economic justice.  

Three Alto Litigation attorneys, Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Josh Korr and Anthony Basile, attended the dinner.

Please join us in celebrating and supporting the excellent work of the LCCRSF so that it can continue to make a positive impact in our communities. You can learn more about the LCCRSF and it mission here: https://lccrsf.org/

Supreme Court Protects Whistleblower Claims

What does a plaintiff have to prove to sustain a whistleblowing claim under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Must whistleblowers show that the employer who fired them acted with the intent to retaliate because of protected whistleblower activity? Or is it sufficient for the employee only to show that the whistleblower activity was a “contributing factor” in the employer’s action, shifting the burden to the employer to show that the employee still would have been fired in the absence of the whistleblowing?

On this important question, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that an employee fired by an investment bank need prove only that his whistleblower conduct contributed to his dismissal but “he is not required to make some further showing that his employer acted with “’retaliatory intent.’”  In Murray v. UBS Securities, Inc., No. 22-660 (Feb. 8, 2024), the Court reversed and remanded a holding by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that overturned a jury verdict in favor of Trevor Murray, a former UBS research strategist who alleged that he was fired after telling his supervisor that he was being pressured to “skew” required reports in violation of Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules.  The Court’s ruling demonstrates that Sarbanes-Oxley is a powerful pro-employee statute and that employers risk substantial liability by punishing whistleblowers.

Rejecting the argument that Murray had to prove that UBS acted with retaliatory intent in firing him, the Court significantly held that the whistleblower protection provisions of  Sarbanes-Oxley are violated whenever an employer treats someone worse – whether by firing or demoting them or imposing some other unfavorable change in the terms or conditions of employment – because of protected whistleblower activity.

Although Murray’s claim concerned the whistle-blowing protections under Sarbanes-Oxley, the Court’s ruling will affect the analysis of burden-shifting provisions in other federal statutes.  A ruling affirming the Second Circuit would have significantly impaired whistleblowing claims because it is often difficult to prove that an employer’s intent to retaliate was the exclusive reason for an employee’s dismissal.  Further, the Court resolved a conflict among the Circuit Courts, since the Second Circuit’s requirement that whistleblowers must prove retaliatory intent was in direct conflict with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. See Coppinger-Martin v. Solis, 627 F. 3d 745 (9th Cir. 2010).

Murray’s responsibilities at UBS included reporting on CMBS markets to current and future customers. SEC rules required him to certify that his reports were prepared independently and accurately reflected his own views. Murray allegedly told his direct supervisor that two leaders on the CMBS trading desk improperly pressured him to make his reports more supportive of their trading strategies and to clear his reports with the trading desk. When he again complained, the supervisor, who previously had given Murray a strong performance report, recommended that Murray be fired.

Murray filed a lawsuit under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, which was added by Sarbanes-Oxley, and prohibits publicly traded companies from retaliating against employees who report what they reasonably believe to be instances of criminal fraud or securities laws violations. §1514A references other federal law that requires a plaintiff to show that his whistleblowing was a contributing factor in any adverse personnel action but allows the employer to still prevail by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same action even in the absence of the whistleblowing.

After a trial, the jury awarded Murray approximately $900,000 in damages while the court added $1.769 million in attorney’s fees and costs.  But the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that  Murray need not prove that UBS acted with retaliatory intent. Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, 43 F. 4th 254 (2d Cir. 2022).

Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court, held that the text of § 1541A does not reference or include a retaliatory intent requirement nor does the burden-shifting framework support such a requirement.  Further, the text provides that an employer may not “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of” protected whistleblowing conduct. The Second Circuit and UBS argued that the company had not discriminated against Murray.  But the Court stated that the term “discriminate” applied to conduct not covered by the other terms, and there was no doubt that Murray was discharged. Also, an animus-like retaliatory intent is absent from the definition of discriminate.  “Showing that an employer acted with retaliatory animus is one way of proving that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse employment action, but it is not the only way.”  The jury had found that Murray’s protected activity was a contributing factor in his firing while UBS failed to show that it would have taken the same action anyways. To the extent that the contributing-factor framework is not as protective of employers as other federal statutes, that was a policy decision made by Congress.

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

The Digital Age of Investing: How Social Media Posts Can Trigger Securities Law Liability

What do you get when you combine the Depression-era U.S. securities laws with today’s social media environment? A circuit split, of course. 

The digital transformation in communication has brought to the forefront a pressing legal issue: the extent to which social media posts can lead to liability under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933. One of the key issues is whether individuals or entities that use social media to promote securities can be considered “sellers,” making them liable for potential misstatements or omissions in their posts.

This matter gained significant attention with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pino v. Cardone Capital LLC, 55 F. 4th 1253 (9th Cir. 2022). In Pino, the Ninth Circuit held that promoting securities through social media could indeed constitute “selling,” subjecting the promoters to potential liability under Section 12(a)(2). This decision not only highlights the evolving nature of securities promotion in the digital age but also underscores a growing disparity among various judicial circuits on how to interpret these laws in the context of modern technology.

Background on Securities Promotion and Social Media

Social media has dramatically transformed securities promotion. Platforms like Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube are now powerful tools for individuals and entities to discuss, endorse, and promote various investment opportunities. Such promotion is more accessible and reaches a far wider audience than traditional methods. It allows for direct, real-time engagement with potential investors, making it an attractive avenue for companies and influencers alike.

But social media also entails unique challenges and risks. The potential dissemination of false or misleading information, whether intentional or not, is amplified by the broad reach of social media. That can create significant market impact in a short time.  A related risk is less checks and balances since the informality and immediacy of social media can lead to less rigorous information vetting compared to traditional investment disclosures. Regulators, not to mention plaintiffs’ lawyers, are taking notice.

For example, in December 2022, the SEC charged eight social media influencers with securities fraud in a $100 million scheme. These individuals allegedly used Twitter and Discord to manipulate exchange-traded stocks. They cultivated a substantial following on these platforms, promoting certain stocks, and then sold their shares for profit (i.e., “pump and dump”) when the prices rose, all without disclosing their plans to their followers. 

In the context of U.S. securities law, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 is particularly relevant to the issue of social media and securities promotion. This section addresses the liability associated with false or misleading statements in the context of selling or offering to sell securities. Sections 12(a)(1) and (2) permit a private right of action based on the failure to register securities with the SEC without a proper exemption (12(a)(1)) and for the offer or sale of securities by means of a prospectus or an oral or communication that contained material misstatements or omissions (12(a)(2)). But the Supreme Court has held that a statutory seller under Section 12 is limited only to those who passed title to the securities or who solicited the purchase.

The application of Section 12 to social media posts is a developing area of law, as demonstrated by cases like Pino v. Cardone Capital LLC, which grapple with the definition of “selling” in the context of online promotions.

The Pino Decision

The Pino v. Cardone Capital LLC case revolved around the promotion of securities on social media platforms Instagram and YouTube, by Grant Cardone and his company, Cardone Capital, LLC.

The plaintiff, Luis Pino, invested in funds managed by Cardone Capital and later filed a class action lawsuit, alleging that the defendants violated Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act by making materially misleading statements and omissions in their social media posts promoting the investment in these funds.

The core legal question was whether Cardone and his company could be considered as "sellers" under Section 12(a)(2), even though they did not directly solicit Pino’s investment. The federal district court ruled that Cardone was not a “seller.” However, the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that indirect, mass communications to potential investors through social media posts and online videos can qualify as “solicitations” sufficient to impose liability under Section 12(a)(2). The court explained that: “§ 12 of the Securities Act contains no requirement that a solicitation be directed or targeted to a particular plaintiff . . . [and] that a person can solicit a purchase, within the meaning of the Securities Act, by promoting the sale of a security in a mass communication.”

The Circuit Split

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling follows the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in the case Wildes v. BitConnect Int’l PLC, No. 20-11675 (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022), which also held that videos posted on YouTube and other platforms can constitute solicitation under Section 12, even if not targeted toward any individual purchasers.

However, these decisions are at odds with previous rulings in other courts, such as the Second and Third Circuits, which interpreted the criteria for what constitutes a “seller” under Section 12 more narrowly. These circuits generally require a more direct relationship between the buyer and the seller, focusing on the proximity of the parties involved in the transaction. The emphasis is on the direct solicitation of the sale by the person deemed a seller, a standard that may not easily encompass indirect or mass communications like social media posts. For example, the Second Circuit, in Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 479 (2d Cir. 1988), held that a plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant “actually solicited” the plaintiff's specific investment in order for the defendant to qualify as a seller under Section 12.

This circuit split reflects the ongoing challenge of applying traditional securities law to the modern, digital landscape. Understanding these differing interpretations is crucial for anyone involved in promoting securities, whether through traditional channels or modern platforms like social media. The evolving legal landscape underscores the importance of being aware of the specific legal standards in each jurisdiction to avoid potential liabilities.

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Telling Investors that a Lawsuit is “Without Merit” Comes With Risks

When faced with a lawsuit, it’s common for a public company to argue in the court of public opinion that the claims asserted against it are "without merit." However, as a recent U.S. District Court of the District of Massachusetts ruling in the case of City of Fort Lauderdale Police & Firefighters’ Retirement System v. Pegasystems Inc. demonstrates, such an approach is not without risk. The ruling illustrates the potential pitfalls of language such as “without merit” to describe litigation risks in SEC disclosures, particularly when internal evidence suggests a different story. In an environment where every corporate statement can be put under the judicial microscope, this case serves as a stark reminder of the need for careful, accurate communication when litigation is pending.

Background and Case Overview

Pegasystems Inc., a software company, found itself at the center of a legal maelstrom that began with a lawsuit filed in Virginia state court in 2020. The root of the dispute lay in allegations that Pegasystems had willfully and maliciously misappropriated trade secrets from its competitor, Appian Corporation. This corporate espionage saga unfolded over several years, involving allegations that Pegasystems employees posed as customers to access Appian’s proprietary information. In February, 2022, Appian filed an amended complaint for $3 billion, after which Pegasystems filed its Form 10-K in which it described the claims it faced as ”without merit,” and alleging that it had “strong defenses to these claims,” and that “any alleged damages claimed by Appian are not supported by the necessary legal standard.” Ultimately, a jury found Pegasystems liable for misappropriation of trade secrets, and the company was ordered to pay over $2 billion in damages.

The repercussions of this case extended beyond the Virginia courtroom. Following the verdict in Virginia, Pegasystems faced a precipitous drop in its stock price of approximately 28%. This drop set the stage for a new legal battle: a securities fraud class action filed against Pegasystems and its key executives, including its CEO and CFO. The crux of this lawsuit hinged on the company's earlier statements in its SEC filings, including the assertion that the Appian lawsuit was "without merit." This claim, made when internal evidence allegedly suggested otherwise, became a focal point of the securities lawsuit.

Pegasystems moved to dismiss the complaint for “failure to state a claim alleging that Fort Lauderdale has not pled facts with particularity establishing (1) that any of the challenged statements are false or misleading, (2) a strong inference of scienter, and (3) loss causation.”

The Court’s Analysis

The court denied the motion to dismiss as to Pegasystems and its CEO. The court found that Pegasystems assertion that the claims were “without merit” was an actionable statement of opinion, explaining that Pegasystems had “categorically denied that Appian’s claims had any merit—despite possessing substantial information about the viability of those claims.” Therefore, the statement did not “fairly align” with its knowledge at the time it made it. The court also found that Pegasystems’ reference in its SEC filing to a code of conduct in which it promised that it would “never use illegal or questionable means to acquire a competitor’s trade secrets” was also an actionable misrepresentation. 

As to the CEO, the court found that, given his alleged involvement in misappropriating trade secrets, he would have known that his statement about the merits of the trade secret litigation "posed a substantial likelihood of misleading a reasonable investor." The court further noted that the "false denial of Appian's claims' merit posed an obvious danger to mislead investors as to the substantial financial risk Pega was facing" in connection with the misappropriation lawsuit. The shareholder class action lawsuit was allowed to proceed.

So what is a company to do when making a public disclosure about litigation in similar circumstances? The judge in this case provides some potentially safer alternatives to asserting that such claims are “without merit.” According to the court, a company may “assert its intention to oppose the lawsuit,” or “state that it has ‘substantial defenses” against it,” provided  “it reasonably believes that to be true.”

The bottom line is that companies must take great care, and consult with experienced legal counsel, before making any statements or disclosures to investors regarding pending litigation. As the court explained, an “issuer may legitimately oppose a claim against it, even when it possesses subjective knowledge that the facts underlying the claims against it are true. When it decides to do so, however, it must do so with exceptional care, so as not to mislead investors.”

In many cases, the best approach is to tread lightly in the court of public opinion while vigorously advocating in the court of law. Voltaire has a good rule of thumb here: “Everything you say should be true, but not everything true should be said.”

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Three Alto Litigation Attorneys Contribute Chapter to Chambers and Partners’ Prestigious 2024 Litigation Global Practice Guide

We are thrilled to announce that three Alto Litigation attorneys contributed a chapter on trends in California litigation for Chambers and Partners’ prestigious 2024 Litigation Global Practice Guide. The contributing attorneys, whose insights on trends in California securities litigation are featured, are Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, and Jared Kopel.

The 2024 Litigation Global Practice Guide features 70 jurisdictions. It provides the latest legal information on litigation trends, funding, initiating a lawsuit, pre-trial proceedings, discovery, injunctive relief, trials and hearings, settlement, damages and judgment, appeals, costs, and alternative dispute resolution (ADR), including arbitration.

The topics that Bahram, Bryan, and Jared address and analyze include: 

1. California courts adopt Delaware’s Caremark standard of liability for directors asleep at the wheel

2. Bank failures and down rounds precipitate shareholder actions

3. Plaintiffs include state securities fraud claims in federal complaints

4. California continues to be a hotbed of litigation concerning cybersecurity breaches

5. New climate disclosure laws may lead to new disclosure claims

6. The SEC continues to go after California crypto-companies

As they say, knowledge is power, so if you’re looking to stay abreast of trends and developments in California securities litigation, we encourage you to read this chapter, which can be found here. Many of the insights shared are based on real-world experience and expertise gained by our attorneys working at the forefront of important securities litigation cases in California. 

We appreciate Chambers and Partners calling upon us to address these important issues!

The U.S. Supreme Court to Rule on Item 303’s Role in Section 10(b) Claims

Can an alleged failure to meet the disclosure requirements under Item 303 of Regulation S-K constitute a claim for securities fraud under Section 10(b)? That’s the key question the U.S. Supreme Court will consider in Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation v. Moab Partners, L.P., No. 22-1165, which will be argued and decided this year. One way or the other, the Court’s decision will resolve a circuit court split, and either expand or restrict the scope for Rule 10(b) to be used as a tool for private securities plaintiffs.

Case Background

The controversy in Macquarie centers on Item 303 of Regulation S-K. Item 303 requires publicly traded companies to provide a Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) of their financial condition and results of operations. The MD&A is a critical section in a company’s annual report (Form 10-K) and other periodic reports. It offers investors a narrative, through the eyes of management, about the company’s financial performance, including its liquidity, capital resources, and operating results.

A central requirement of Item 303 is that companies must disclose any known trends, demands, commitments, events, or uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have a material effect on the company’s financial condition or operating performance. This is not just a backward-looking requirement; companies must also assess and disclose expected future events or conditions that could have a significant impact.

In this case, Moab Partners LP filed suit under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, alleging that Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation had failed to disclose its analysis, as required by Item 303, of the potentially negative impact that new international oil regulations were anticipated to have on the company. The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed and held that the alleged omission could constitute a violation of Item 303 and serve as the basis for a claim under Section 10(b).

The Second Circuit decision is at odds with rulings of the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have previously rejected the contention that a failure to comply with Item 303 can underpin a Section 10(b) claim. The Supreme Court’s ruling, therefore, will resolve this circuit split.

Implications of the Court’s Ruling

A decision by the Supreme Court to affirm the Second Circuit’s ruling would likely result in increased scrutiny of the Management Discussion and Analysis section in corporate filings, and open the door to more Rule 10(b) lawsuits alleging violations of Item 303. If that happens, companies might adopt more cautious and detailed approaches to their disclosures, including becoming more proactive in identifying and disclosing material risks and uncertainties, to mitigate the risk of litigation.

However, this increased scrutiny could lead to a dilemma between achieving clarity and avoiding information overload in SEC reporting. The SEC has generally encouraged clarity and materiality in disclosures, and including more information doesn’t necessarily serve this purpose. It’s easy to envision a scenario where, due to fear of litigation, companies might opt to pack reports with excessive details. This could increase transparency—or, on the other hand, it could make it challenging for investors to discern critical information, potentially diluting the effectiveness of these disclosures.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Macquarie is poised to have broad implications in securities law and corporate disclosures. It will likely influence how companies approach their disclosure obligations and could expand the scope of securities litigation to the extent the Court adopts the Second Circuit’s approach. We will watch this case closely and report back once the Court has issued its ruling.

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

A Friend of the Court is a Friend of Mine: Amicus Briefs in District Court

All litigators have at least some familiarity with amicus briefs in the federal appellate courts.  Such briefs give interested third parties—“friends of the court”—a say in important appeals that may result in binding precedent affecting the world at large.  

What many litigators don’t know is that amicus briefs are also often allowed at the district court level.  Yet well-read subject matter experts often spot impending appellate disputes while they are still at the trial court stage, giving them an opportunity to weigh in on a dispute before it even reaches the appellate court.

Unlike the federal appellate courts, many district courts—including the Northern District of California—do not have defined procedures for filing an amicus brief.  Yet the district courts nonetheless have the discretion to allow amicus filings—and will often do so in the right case. See, e.g., United States v. Gotti, 755 F.Supp. 1157, 1158 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); NGV Gaming, Ltd. v. Upstream Point Molate, LLC, 355 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2005); N. Carolina State Conf. of NAACP v. Cooper, 332 F.R.D. 161, 173 (M.D.N.C. 2019); Alexander v. Hall, 64 F.R.D. 152, 155 (D.S.C. 1974).  

If you seek to file an amicus brief, you will need to seek leave of the district court.  The motion for leave should state your client’s interest, explain how the amicus brief will assist the court, and should (of course) attach the amicus brief itself.

In addition, the following tips will help ensure that your amicus brief is accepted and considered by a district court:

  • Make sure the amicus brief is timely.  It must give the opposing side an opportunity to respond.  We have seen district courts reject amicus briefs filed too far along in the process.

  • Make sure to establish exactly why your client’s voice should be heard.  Emphasize the personal or institutional expertise that your client has in the matter, or the potential negative consequences that your client may feel if the district court goes the wrong way.

  • Make sure your client’s amicus brief does in fact offer a unique perspective.  If the brief simply repeats arguments made by a named party, the court may reject the brief as cumulative.

  • Make sure not to frame the amicus brief in overly argumentative terms.  The role of amicus curiae should be limited to suggesting a different legal perspective or offering unique information to the court.  Amicus filings phrased as “oppositions” or in other adversarial terms may be rejected as exceeding the role of an amicus curiae.

  • Make sure the amicus brief filed in district court otherwise adheres to the same procedural requirements of the applicable appellate court.  Although not expressly required, this will give the district court assurance that fair procedures have been applied. 

If you follow these tips, a blossoming friendship with the court may follow.  

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Anthony Basile Joins Alto Litigation as Attorney

We are pleased to announce that attorney Anthony Basile has joined our growing team of talented legal professionals. Anthony has experience representing clients in a variety of litigation and transactional matters, including commercial disputes, real property litigation and transactions, employment litigation and counseling, and intellectual property litigation and counseling.  

Anthony’s hiring exemplifies a core value of our firm, which is to provide opportunities for attorneys and other professionals who have pursued non-traditional, alternative career paths. In the case of Anthony, who is a graduate of Stanford University and Santa Clara University School of Law, this hiring marks his re-entry into the practice of law after spending a few years caring for his children full-time while his wife pursued her career goals. 

“We’re delighted to welcome Anthony to Alto Litigation,” said firm founder Bahram Seyedin-Noor. “He will be a key contributor in serving the complex and sophisticated litigation needs of our clients as part of the largest and most talented team we’ve had since our inception.”

Please join us in welcoming Anthony to Alto Litigation!

Recent Developments in SEC Crypto Enforcement

On November 14, 2023, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) issued its enforcement recap for its fiscal year 2023. It was a busy year, indeed, with the SEC filing 784 enforcement actions, obtaining orders for nearly $5 billion in financial remedies, and distributing nearly $1 billion to harmed investors. The crypto industry was among the SEC’s targets for enforcement actions. In its report, the SEC called 2023 a "highly productive and impactful year" for crypto-related enforcement efforts. However, the SEC also suffered several crypto-litigation setbacks during the year, which may force it to rethink its approach to enforcement in this burgeoning industry. 

In an effort to keep you apprised of the latest trends in SEC crypto enforcement, here are some recent notable developments.

Coinbase Receives and Responds to Wells Notice; SEC Brings Suit

In March, 2023, the SEC issued a Wells notice to crypto exchange Coinbase, warning the company that it had identified potential violations of U.S. securities laws. A Wells notice is often a final step prior to the SEC bringing formal charges against a company. It generally lays out the SEC’s argument and offers the accused an opportunity to rebut the claims. In this case, the SEC was looking at Coinbase’s crypto staking business, its  investment and custody services, and part of its spot trading business.

In April, Coinbase filed its response to the notice, and made it publicly available. In its response, the company asserted that “Coinbase does not list, clear, or effect trading in securities.”

In June, the SEC charged Coinbase with operating its trading platform as an unregistered national securities exchange, broker, and clearing agency, in a complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The SEC also charged Coinbase for failing to register the offer and sale of its crypto asset staking-as-a-service program. In August, Coinbase sought the dismissal of the charges, arguing the SEC is stepping outside of its jurisdiction in suing the crypto exchange. The SEC filed its response in early October, and Coinbase filed a Reply Memorandum later that month. As of the date this post was published, no decision on Coinbase’s Motion to Dismiss was issued.

Coinbase Seeks to Compel SEC to Establish Crypto Rules and Regulations

While defending itself against the SEC, Coinbase has also gone on the attack, filing a Writ for Petition of Mandamus to the SEC with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in April, 2023.

Coinbase is asking the court to order the SEC to respond to its July 2022 petition urging the agency to “propose and adopt rules to govern the regulation of securities that are offered and traded via digitally native methods.” This action is still pending. On October 11, the SEC filed a pleading explaining, in regard to Coinbase’s request for crypto rules and regulations, that “Commission staff provided a recommendation to the Commission” on October 10. In response, Coinbase asserted that the SEC’s “laconic” update “ducks this Court’s critical questions.”

The SEC Drops its Case Against Two Ripple Labs Executives

In 2020, the SEC sued Ripple Labs Inc., accusing the company and its executives of conducting a $1.3 billion securities fraud via sales of XRP to retail investors. 

In July, a federal judge granted partial victories to both the SEC and Ripple in ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment regarding whether sales of Ripple's digital token XRP violated the federal securities laws. The court held that sales of XRP to institutional investors involved securities under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

However, the court ruled that so-called Programmatic Sales on crypto exchanges did not involve securities because the purchasers were not buying directly from Ripple, and therefore could not reasonably expect a profit derived from Ripple's efforts (the third prong of the Howey test). The court also found that other distributions of XRP were not securities (read our comprehensive analysis here). 

In a more recent development, in October 2023 the SEC dropped civil charges of aiding and abetting against Ripple executives Christian Larsen and Brad Garlinghouse, who, the SEC had alleged, had aided and abetted Ripple’s violations of the securities laws. However, the SEC will continue pursuing its claims against Ripple, according to the SEC’s filing.

SEC Brings Charges Against Kraken

On November 20, 2023, the SEC charged Payward Inc. and Payward Ventures Inc., known as “Kraken,” with operating a crypto trading platform as an unregistered securities exchange, broker, dealer, and clearing agency.

The SEC alleges that Kraken provides the traditional services of an exchange, broker, dealer, and clearing agency without having registered any of those functions with the SEC as required by law.

Conclusion

There continues to be a great deal of uncertainty about how the securities laws apply to the cryptocurrency industry. One thing that seems certain is that the SEC will continue aggressive enforcement of this space. We will continue to update you with new developments.

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Empowering Refugees, Reflecting Our Values: Alto Litigation Supports Asylum Access

Imagine a world where over 26 million people are compelled to flee their homes, not out of choice but necessity, driven by violence and persecution. This daunting reality is what Asylum Access confronts head-on, day after day. Their mission is monumental: to empower refugees, influence policy for lasting change, and foster leadership within refugee communities. Asylum Access's policy change efforts have positively impacted over 1.08 million refugees, and its legal empowerment services provide a path to dignity and hope.

The work that Asylum Access does for refugees and asylum seekers hits particularly close to home for Alto Litigation founder Bahram Seyedin-Noor, himself a first-generation immigrant, whose family escaped from Iran after the revolution in 1979. He and his family were smuggled through the desert in Afghanistan, and ultimately settled in America.

These and other reasons inspire us at Alto Litigation to support Asylum Access and other worthy causes in communities in which we work and live—in this season of giving and all year round. We recently made a financial contribution to Asylum Access to support its work, and if you’re interested in doing the same, or learning more about the organization, we encourage you to visit www.asylumaccess.org.

As we continue our partnership with Asylum Access, we're reminded of the broader impact of our profession. Law isn't just about complex statutes and courtroom battles; it's a powerful tool for change for people in our community, our country, around the world. Together, through support of organizations like Asylum Access, we can help shape a world where every individual, regardless of their circumstances, has the opportunity to live a life of dignity and purpose.

5 Things We're Thankful for this Holiday Season

With Thanksgiving upon us, we’re taking a moment to reflect and express our gratitude. While this has been a challenging year for many in our community, our country, and around the world, we are mindful of the resilience and strength demonstrated in the face of adversity. These times have reminded us of the importance of coming together, supporting each other, and finding strength in our collective spirit. At Alto Litigation, we recognize the blessings we have received this year. In the spirit of Thanksgiving, here are five things we are especially thankful for:

1. Our Valued Clients: First and foremost, we are deeply thankful for our clients. Your trust in us to handle your most pressing and consequential legal matters is not taken lightly. We are grateful for your continued support and the opportunity to serve you.

2. Our Dedicated Team: We are thankful for the dedication, talent, and hard work of each member of our firm. From our attorneys to our professional staff, each person plays a crucial role in our ability to serve clients. And we’d also like to acknowledge the families of our team members, who play an integral role in enabling us to do the demanding work that a busy litigation practice requires.

3. The San Francisco/Bay Area Community: Our roots in this dynamic and resilient community fill us with pride. Your entrepreneurial spirit and dedication to critical causes are a constant source of inspiration. We are proud to contribute to the community that has given us so much.

4. The Legal Community's Collegiality: The camaraderie and professionalism within the legal community have been fundamental to our growth. This collegial spirit has been a cornerstone in our firm's decade-long journey.

5. The Spirit of Giving Back: Lastly, we are thankful for the good fortune we’ve had, which has provided the opportunity to give back. Whether it's through pro bono work, community service, or supporting local causes, we are grateful for the chance to make a positive impact in the lives of others. This week we’re making a meaningful contribution to Asylum Access, an organization aiding refugees through legal and policy initiatives.

This Thanksgiving, we extend our heartfelt thanks to everyone who has been part of our journey. We look forward to continuing to serve and grow with you in the coming year.

Happy Thanksgiving from all of us at Alto Litigation.

Snap Removal: Unfair Gamesmanship or Fair Play?

Oh, snap!  What’s that sound?  It may be the “snap removal” of your state court complaint to the federal courthouse.   Here are the basics of “snap removal” with tips to avoid it—or invoke it.  

Generally speaking, where complete diversity of citizenship exists between plaintiffs on the one hand and defendants on the other hand, defendants can remove a case filed in state court to federal court.  28 U.S.C. § 1441.  An exception is the so-called forum defendant rule, which states that a defendant sued in state court typically cannot remove to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction where at least one defendant is a citizen of the forum state.  But there’s an exception to this exception: removal may be allowed so long as a defendant files the notice of removal before a forum defendant is “properly joined and served.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (emphasis added).  This means that the swift defendant who learns of the state court complaint–and then files a notice of removal—before formal service of any local defendant may escape to federal court.  

Not all courts agree that “snap removal” is legitimate.  Even in the Northern District of California, judges are split.  Some view “snap removal” as an absurd outcome: it rewards gamesmanship while undermining the plaintiff’s choice of forum, the limited nature of diversity jurisdiction, and presumptions against removal.  Yet others endorse “snap removal” as compelled by the statutory language that conditions removal on a local defendant having been “served.”  28 § U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).  

With this backdrop, both plaintiffs and defendants should be prepared to deal with “snap removal.”  

For plaintiffs and their counsel hoping to lessen the risk of “snap removal”: craft a plan for a quick service of at least one forum defendant before filing the complaint.  This could mean scouting the agent of service for a corporate defendant, and/or the home addresses for an individual.  And then, once the complaint is filed and the summons is issued, complete service as fast as possible.  If a defendant receives informal notice of the lawsuit—whether through a courtesy copy, word of mouth, or otherwise—then the greater the length of time between such informal notice and actual service, the greater the risk of “snap removal.” 

For defendants and their counsel hoping to take advantage of “snap removal”: be on your toes.  You will need to react quickly to remove any state court complaint before it is served.  You can get instant notice of any complaint cheaply by subscribing to an automated tracker of public court dockets.  It may take a few days for the state court to issue the summons needed for the plaintiff to formalize service, and a notice of removal is a simple pleading.  You may snap yourself into a more favorable forum with stricter pleading standards and less onerous discovery rules.

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Bahram Seyedin-Noor Co-Authors Latest Edition of LexisNexis’ Book “Litigating and Judging California Business Entity Governance Disputes”

Corporate governance is a critical function of any corporation—and commonly the subject of litigation disputes. New trends and new legal developments are continually arising in the realm of corporate governance, so it’s critical for corporate leaders and legal practitioners to stay on top of what’s happening.

One of the best ways to stay abreast of trends and developments, in California, in particular, is to check out LexisNexis’ latest edition of “Litigating and Judging California Business Entity Governance Disputes” – a seminal treatise that guides practitioners through a variety of complex business matters involving management, ownership and control of California corporations, LLCs, and general and limited partnerships.

Alto Litigation’s Bahram Seyedin-Noor is the author of Chapter 2 of “Litigating and Judging California Business Entity Governance Disputes,” covering disputes between and among a corporation’s shareholders and its managers relating to the management of the corporation itself.  Alto partners Bryan Ketroser and Josh Korr also contributed to the chapter which provides relevant citations to statutes and court decisions, together with insights, helpful tips and creative solutions for arbitrators, attorneys and judges, who are dealing with disputes regarding the management of a corporation. 

For more information and to purchase the new edition visit LexisNexis.

A Welcome Change: Ninth Circuit Will Require In-Person Appearances in 2024

When COVID-19 struck, lawyers had to adapt in many different ways. One of the most significant changes, for litigators, in particular, was engaging in courtroom advocacy remotely. This posed many challenges—and not merely technical difficulties. As litigators who relish opportunities to advocate on behalf of our clients live and in person, we were pleased to see the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s recent announcement that in-person appearances will be required as of January 2024.

The Ninth Circuit currently uses a hybrid approach to oral argument, allowing remote or in-person appearance. Moving forward, according to the Ninth Circuit, “As of January 2024, all counsel and parties invited to argue before the court are expected to appear in person.”

It will still be possible for a lawyer to appear remotely. However, in order to do so, a lawyer must file a motion requesting such relief, demonstrating that an in-person appearance would pose a hardship. Such a motion is to be filed within seven days of the calendaring notice.

Despite the Ninth Circuit’s move back to in person appearances, many courts across the country continue to allow lawyers to appear remotely. A Bloomberg article earlier this year reported that Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Minnesota, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Texas “have all integrated remote operations into their state courts’ permanent playbooks.”

There are undoubtedly benefits to be gained, in terms of time- and cost-savings, for certain pre-trial, non-evidentiary hearings to be held remotely. But when it comes to trial work and appeals, the ability to look in people’s eyes, gauge the mood of the room, and immerse oneself fully in the moment—free from the inevitable technical glitches, is essential for effective advocacy.

We welcome more time spent in the halls and courtrooms of the Ninth Circuit in the year ahead!

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Legal Trivia: Statute of Limitations Edition

All lawyers, and even many laypersons, are familiar with statutes of limitations (“SOLs”).  And most attorneys know at least the garden-variety ways in which parties routinely try to get around them, such as the delayed discovery rule and the doctrine of equitable tolling.  But the ubiquity of statutes of limitations, combined with the drastic consequences they wreak when not adhered to, has created a rich, if arcane, body of statutory and decisional law that can be useful to the well-read litigator.  Below are just a few of the more interesting SOL tidbits.

Where the SOL Is Defined by a Number of Years, a Claim Brought on the Anniversary of Accrual Is Timely

If a claim accrued on January 1, 2023, and the SOL is 1 year, you might think that it needs to be brought by December 31, 2023.  But Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 12 provides:  “The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day, and including the last, unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is also excluded.”  In other words:  “Section 12 sets forth a method of calculation that ultimately results in the anniversary method of calculating the final date for the statute of limitations.”  Shalabi v. City of Fontana, 35 Cal. App. 5th 639, 643 (2019) (holding, where claim accrued December 3, 2011, complaint had to be filed by December 3, 2013 to be within 2-year SOL). 

No, an Intervening Leap Year Does Not Impact the Anniversary Method 

We typically think of years being 365, but of course, every fourth year 366 days.  In California, the SOL for breach of a written contract is 4 years.  Some California SOLs are even longer.  You (or an opponent) might at some point be tempted to argue that an intervening February 29th since accrual of a claim means the SOL runs (or ran) the day before the anniversary of accrual.  You (or your opponent) would be wrong.  Per Government Code § 6803:  “‘Year’ means a period of 365 days,” but “[t]he added day of a leap year, and the day immediately preceding, if they occur in any such period, shall be reckoned together as one day.”  Translation:  February 28 and 29 are treated as a single day for SOL purposes.  See also People v. Hill, 2 Cal. App. 2d 141, 146-47 (1934) (October 20, 1933 indictment, charging embezzlement on October 21, 1930, not barred by 3-year SOL on theory that 1932 was a leap year).

SOLs Are (Sometimes) Tolled While the Defendant Is Out of State (Maybe)

While perhaps the most frequently invoked, equitable tolling is not the only flavor of SOL tolling.  There are many statutes that toll SOLs as well.  One of the more interesting ones is CCP § 351:  “If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of the State, the action may be commenced within the term herein limited, after his return to the State, and if, after the cause of action accrues, he departs from the State, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.”  Basically:  An SOL is tolled while the defendant is not in California.

However, it’s not so simple.  For one thing, CCP § 351 clashes with the US Constitution’s Interstate Commerce Clause to the extent its application imposes unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce.  Thus, where a California resident travels to another state for purposes “unrelated to the service of interstate commerce,” the SOL likely will be tolled under CCP § 351, whereas if the travel is for the facilitation of interstate commerce, application of CCP § 351 would be unconstitutional, and no tolling occurs.  Filet Menu, Inc. v. Cheng, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1276, 1283-84.  Note that even if the defendant is not traveling for a specific job, the court may still find the travel related to the service of interstate commerce. 

Where CCP § 351 does apply, it can be very powerful, particularly where the defendant is a non-resident natural person.  See, e.g., Green v. Zissis, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1219, 1223 (1992) (10-year SOL for claim that accrued in 1977 “did not begin to run because defendant was then absent from the state and has remained absent to this day”).  Again, though, the devil’s in the details.  For instance, CCP s 351 generally does not toll the SOL where the claim arises out of a nonresident motorist getting into an accident on California roads.  

A Defendant’s Bankruptcy Extends SOLs for Claims Against Them Until After the Conclusion of the Bankruptcy Stay

Bankruptcy filings generally stay then-pending litigation against the bankrupt defendant.  It stands to reason, then, that federal law—specifically, 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)—also impacts SOLs for claims against a defendant while that defendant is in bankruptcy proceedings.  Importantly, however, 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) does not toll such SOLs.  Instead, it merely provides that SOLs do not expire until the later of (1) the time they otherwise would expire or (2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the bankruptcy stay.  The upshot is that a prospective plaintiff may technically be able to file their claim against a bankrupt party later than they otherwise would, but they may have to wait months, if not years, for that defendant to go through bankruptcy proceedings, before having to file in a very short window in which to file.  (And that’s assuming the claim itself was not discharged in bankruptcy.)

Covid Emergency Rules Generally Add About 6 Months to Claims that Accrued Pre-Pandemic

Facing a growing pandemic of then-unknown proportions or end date, in April 2020, then-Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye of the California Supreme Court issued a set of emergency rules.  Among them, Rule 9(a) provided:  “Notwithstanding any other law, the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days are tolled from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020.”  Roughly two years later, Rule 9 was amended to state that the rule “will sunset on June 30, 2022, unless otherwise amended or repealed by the Judicial Council.”  While this might sound as if Rule 9 is a dead letter, an Advisory Committee Comment makes clear that “the effect of the tolling may survive beyond the sunset date of the rule.”  

Statute of limitations arguments can make or break cases, often at the outset of a matter.  The above are just a few of the arrows that savvy counsel have in their quiver for those battles.

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Five Things to Know When Litigating in Santa Clara County Superior Court’s Complex Division

Home to Silicon Valley, Santa Clara County has seen countless tech fairy tales over the past 70 years.  In turn, the Santa Clara County Superior Court—and in particular, its Complex Division—has been the backdrop to myriad Silicon Valley nightmares.  

We’ve written in the past about reasons to consider designating your case as complex in California Superior Court.  Here, we discuss some of the more distinctive characteristics of one of the most important departments, in one of the most important courts, of the state.

Discovery Routinely Is Stayed Until the Initial Case Management Conference

Aggressive advocates often take advantage of rules that permit defendants to begin serving discovery at the outset of a case, and permit plaintiffs to begin serving discovery just ten days after a defendant has been served with the summons.  At present, the Complex Division of the Santa Clara Superior Court (“SC Complex Division”) has no local rule or standing order to the contrary.  However, for many years, the SC Complex Division has, as a matter of practice, routinely stayed discovery (and responsive pleading deadlines) at the same time it designates a case as complex, until the initial case management conference.  Since it sometimes take 2-3 months (or more) before the SC Complex Division conducts the initial CMC, counsel and parties should carefully consider the implications of such a stay.

“Informal Discovery Conferences” Are Not Just for Party Discovery Disputes

While hardly the only court to utilize the “Informal Discovery Conference” or “IDC” procedure, the SC Complex Division judges are, in our experience, superfans.  They regularly invite parties to come to them with IDC requests, and typically are available on relatively short notice (1-2 weeks, rather than months).  Indeed, SC Complex Division judges often are willing to help resolve disputes involving non-parties (like subpoena recipients) and even non-discovery matters through IDCs.  

Parties Often Set Briefing Schedules—So Long as the Court Gets Extra Time to Review Replies

In an age when parties often wait months after filing their motion before it is heard, one might question the logic of giving the responding party until just nine court days before the hearing to file their opposition, and then jamming the moving party with a reply brief just four court days later.  (The Northern District of California’s Civil Local Rules set briefing deadlines based on the timing of the opening brief, rather than the timing of the hearing date.)  Fortunately, the SC Complex Division encourages parties to set their own stipulated briefing schedule.  Just keep in mind that, in our experience, the SC Complex Division judges want at least two weeks between the reply brief and the hearing date, rather than the statutory one week. 

The Court Has Its Own Model Protective Order

Parties to complex civil litigation typically want assurances that the information and documents they produce in discovery will not be made public or used outside of the litigation.  This typically is accomplished through a stipulated protective order at the outset of the case.  However, lawyers often have their own preferred templates, which of course can vary significantly from person to person.  It is worth noting, then, that the SC Complex Division itself has a model protective order for parties to use.  Parties looking for the ability to designate produced documents or information as “Confidential” should start by reviewing the model order to see whether it suits their needs.  The model order only provides for one level of confidentiality, and if any (or all) of the parties require the possibility of “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” protection, or otherwise want additional or different terms, the SC Complex Division judges typically are amenable.  

Familiarize Yourself with Both the Complex Civil Guidelines and the Other Rules Cited Therein

Lawyers practicing in the SC Complex Division are expected to familiarize themselves with its Complex Civil Guidelines.  In addition to certain unique rules and procedures (such as a requirement for joint case management statements), the Complex Civil Guidelines point to another important ruleset:  the Santa Clara County Bar Association Code of Professionalism.  The SC Complex Division judges take the Code of Professionalism seriously.  Several years ago, the author’s opposing counsel made the mistake of employing ad hominem attacks in their briefing and at oral argument.  When the author commented that the personal attack violated Section 19 of the Code of Professionalism, the judge responded:  

Counsel invoked the code of professionalism.  Anytime someone does that, a little bell goes off.  He gets $50 for doing that.  Because he is right.

The judge then proceeded to lament at length the lack of decorum “in a lot of places” before concluding:  “But here in Department 1 . . . it is alive and well.”  Opposing counsel lost that motion.  The ad hominem attacks were not the primary reason, but they clearly did not help. 

The Complex Division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court is filled with great judges, skilled attorneys, and top companies with interesting legal issues.  It’s a great place to litigate.  Just make sure to bring your A-game (if you’re a lawyer) or your A-team (if you’re a party).

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Territorial Reach of the Federal Securities Laws

The Steve Miller Band had a major hit song, “Living in the U.S.A.”  But increasingly, it is difficult to know if a securities lawsuit may live in the U.S. or belongs in a foreign jurisdiction, as reflected in recent decisions by federal courts.

The turning point was the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).  Prior to Morrison, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted a standard—followed by other Circuits—characterized as the “conduct-and-effects” test for determining whether U.S. courts had jurisdiction over a securities transaction: “(1) whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States, and (2) whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens..”  See, e.g., SEC v. Berger, 322 F. 3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003).  

In Morrison, Australians filed suit in the United States against an Australian bank for allegedly concealing financial problems at a Florida mortgage-servicing company that the bank acquired. Plaintiffs brought claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit, holding that jurisdiction was lacking under the conduct-and-effects analysis because the fraudulent scheme occurred outside the U.S.  The Supreme Court, while agreeing that dismissal was justified, rejected the conduct-and-effects standard, finding that the controlling issue was not jurisdiction, but rather, the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes in the absence of express Congressional support. Because of this presumption, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 applied only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security where that security was listed on a U.S. stock exchange, or the transaction occurred in the U.S.  561 U.S. at 273.

After Morrison, the analysis of extraterritorial jurisdiction falls into two categories – actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and private lawsuits.

SEC Actions

Almost simultaneous with the Morrison decision, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which included a provision (Section 929(p)(b)) conferring jurisdiction on U.S. federal courts for any action filed by the SEC alleging a violation of the antifraud laws involving either: (a) conduct within the U.S. constituting significant steps in furtherance of the violation (even if the transaction occurred outside the U.S.); or (b) conduct occurring outside the U.S. that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the U.S.

Critics charged that Congress had codified the conduct-and-effects test that Morrison had repudiatedHowever, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in SEC v. Scoville, 913 F.3d 1204 (2019), held that Dodd-Frank reflected the Congressional intent that the substantive antifraud provisions of the securities laws should apply extraterritorially in SEC actions.  Other courts similarly have endorsed the SEC’s jurisdiction where there were sufficient contacts between the alleged fraudulent scheme and the U.S. See, e.g., SEC v. Montano, 2020 WL 5534653 (D. Fla. July 24, 2020) (following Scoville, holding defendant took significant steps in pursuing fraud in U.S.); SEC v. Terraform Labs Pte Ltd, 2022 WL 2066414 (2d Cir. June 8, 2022) (jurisdiction where defendants purposefully availed themselves of U.S. by promoting digital assets to U.S. consumers and investors).

Private Actions

Determining whether jurisdiction exists in private litigation has become more problematic.  Morrison instructs parties and courts to ask whether a securities transaction “occurred in the United States,” but what does that mean? One formulation, adopted by the Ninth Circuit, is the “irrevocable liability” test: whether the purchaser of a security incurred irrevocable liability within the U.S. to take and pay for a security or the seller incurred irrevocable liability within the U.S. to deliver the security. See Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F.3d 933, 949 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, the analysis focuses on the nature of the securities transaction, and not the underlying fraud allegations.  And even if a plaintiff purchased a security in the U.S., it would not be considered a domestic transaction if it only became binding outside the U.S. In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the “irrevocable liability” test also has been adopted by the First, Second and Third Circuits.

But even that analysis does not always control.  For example, while the Second Circuit has adopted the “irrevocable liability” test, several decisions have held that although a transaction might be domestic, jurisdiction still is absent if the transaction is “predominantly foreign.” See, e.g., Cavello Bay Reinsurance Ltd. v. Stein, 961F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2021); Parkcentral Global HUB Ltd. v. Porsche Automobile Holdings SE, 763 F. 3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014).

A separate analysis applies to RICO allegations.  A private RICO plaintiff must allege and prove a domestic injury to its business or property.  RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325 (2016). Therefore, the plaintiff must show an injury to property occurred in the U.S. See City of Almaty v. Khrapunov, 956 F. 3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2020) (expenditure of funds to trace allegedly stolen funds of initial theft outside U.S. was not domestic injury); Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC v. UBS AG, 2021 WL 4482826 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021) (use of U.S. wires to send fraudulent confirmations and receive money and sending communications through U.S. did not constitute domestic injury).

Like much of securities law, even simple questions about the territorial reach of the law can have complicated answers.  Particularly when filing or defending securities litigation actions involving foreign parties or transactions, it is important to have experienced, competent counsel who is up-to-date on the latest legal developments.

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Benchmark Litigation 2024 Rankings Recognize Alto Litigation and Three of its Attorneys Among the Top in California

Benchmark Litigation, described as “the definitive guide to the market’s leading firms and lawyers,” recently released its 2024 rankings, and Alto Litigation and its attorneys received several honors.

Alto Litigation was ranked a Recommended Firm in California, a Tier 1 Firm in San Francisco for Dispute Resolution, and was also highly ranked in San Francisco for Securities Litigation. Benchmark also recognized founding partner Bahram Seyedin-Noor as a “Litigation Star” in Securities and General Commercial Litigation; partner Bryan Ketroser as a “Litigation Star” in Securities Litigation; and partner Joshua Korr as a “Future Star” (40 and under). 

Rankings are based on extensive interviews of clients and peers. Benchmark’s analysis noted that Alto Litigation is known for “its trial-tested ability to dynamically punch well above its weight class against the nation’s largest top firms in several litigation niches, representing prominent companies and entrepreneurs in both defense and plaintiff roles.” 

Bahram, a graduate of Harvard Law School, has tried cases before judges and juries in California and Delaware, and was a law clerk to Judge James Ware in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Over the last twenty-three years, Bahram has achieved dozens of victories in securities class actions, derivative lawsuits, arbitrations, trade secrets, and fiduciary duty disputes. In 2021 and 2019, Benchmark Litigation named Bahram the “San Francisco Attorney of the Year” and nominated him for “California Securities Litigation Attorney of the Year” alongside only three other attorneys in the State in multiple years. Chambers & Partners ranks Bahram among California’s top securities litigation practitioners. During Benchmark’s evaluation, a client noted, “Bahram is a brilliant attorney and excellent problem-solver. He is responsive, thorough, effective, and pragmatic – a rare combination.”

Bryan, a graduate of Yale Law School, concentrates his practice on securities litigation, complex commercial litigation, and SEC investigations. He represents technology companies, entrepreneurs, officers, directors, employees and shareholders in high-stakes matters in California, Delaware, and other courts throughout the United States. Benchmark Litigation has recognized Bryan as a Litigation Star since 2021 and, before that, repeatedly included him in its “40 & Under Hot List.”

Joshua is an experienced attorney, well-practiced in litigating a broad range of business disputes in California state and federal courts, and in arbitrations with JAMS and AAA. His areas of expertise include securities litigation, general business disputes, internal and government investigations, trade secrets, high-net-worth family law and Marvin actions, and appellate litigation. He graduated in the top of his class at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law.

Benchmark’s full analysis of Alto Litigation can be found here.

Litigating Against Pro Se Parties in Complex Disputes

Lawyers are used to dealing with other lawyers.  We talk to and negotiate with each other in a certain way, in part because we all start with a (largely) common understanding of basic law and procedure.  Sometimes, though, the party on the other side decides they don’t need a lawyer to represent them—or has that decision made for them when their counsel withdraws in the middle of the case.  And if you think that dealing with competent, stubborn, insert-your-preferred-adjective-here opposing counsel is a challenge, just wait until you have to engage in a lengthy discovery meet and confer with an opposing party directly.  

Below, we offer some thoughts on dealing with pro se litigants in complex disputes.

First, Make Sure They’re Actually Pro Se

Some pro se litigants begin a case with an attorney who then withdraws due to nonpayment or other issues.  Before engaging directly with such a litigant, make sure that they are now, in fact, pro se.  In California state court, where an attorney and client both agree to part ways, they can file a formal substitution of attorney (MC-050) form, which is effective without court order.  Where one or the other does not agree to terminate the representation, a court order is required.  If an opposing party or their “former” attorney tells you that the party is newly pro se, don’t blindly take their word for it; check the docket.  If you don’t, you may run afoul of applicable rules of professional conduct by contacting them.

Make Sure They’re Only Representing Themselves

Just because a person is entitled to represent themselves, does not mean that they can represent others.  This of course precludes a non-lawyer from representing other individuals, or even various entities that they might own, control, or otherwise have a financial or other interest in.  But it also typically precludes a non-lawyer from asserting certain claims in a case, even where they are the sole putative plaintiff.  For instance, class actions, shareholder derivative actions, and qui tam actions all involve claims asserted by a plaintiff in a “representative capacity,” such that the plaintiff typically may only assert them with the assistance of counsel.  Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008).  

Ask that They Be Held to the Same Rules and Standards as Attorneys

In theory, a party who acts as his or her own attorney “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.”  Stover v. Bruntz, 12 Cal. App. 5th 19, 31 (2017) (citation omitted).  This includes everything from discovery and briefing deadlines, to pleading standards, to basic courtroom decorum.  In practice, our experience is that pro se litigants sometimes try to use their unrepresented status as both a sword and a shield—for instance, filing unauthorized pleadings and outrageously-broad discovery, while simultaneously demanding extensions of time and other concessions on account of their pro se status.  If this happens, politely remind them (and the court) that they have to play by the same rules as everyone else.

Don’t Assume that They Actually Will Be Held to the Same Rules and Standards as Attorneys

Notwithstanding the above, don’t be surprised (or discouraged) if a pro se litigant seems to “get away with” a certain amount of intentional or unintentional misconduct.  While it varies by judge and by case—and, perhaps, by day—judges are human, and may show a greater degree of empathy and patience to pro se litigants.  This can, for instance, result in courts granting pro se litigants more time for certain matters than represented parties would get.  An attorney zealously pursuing their own client’s interests might reasonably be more flexible with a pro se opponent, for fear of coming across as a bully and/or alienating the judge.

Expect Erratic Behavior

As heated as attorney exchanges can be, they often can’t hold a candle to the passion exhibited by the parties themselves for their own case.  Attorneys typically view the lawyer on the other side of a case as their “opponent.”  That opponent may be a colleague, a stranger, or even a friend.  It may be someone you like, or someone you dislike.  But to a pro se party on the other side of the ‘v,’ there is a good chance that you are not just an opponent; you are the enemy.  They may yell at you and send you nasty emails.  They may go to the press.  They may even attack the judge, or file a bar complaint against you.  Whatever they do, it’s imperative that you keep your cool, and remember both your professional responsibilities and also that you are dealing with a person who has an emotional stake in the outcome of the case that you do not (or should not) have.

Document Everything

Good lawyers know to document material oral discussion between the parties.  This is particularly important when dealing with pro se parties, who may not understand many of the things that you are obligated to meet and confer with them about, and thus may be more likely to dispute the record if and when it comes to motion practice.  Documentation simultaneously helps mitigate this concern and, when done well, goes a long way toward convincing the court that you’re treating your pro se opponent fairly and with respect.

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.

Service 2.0: Courts Increasingly Embrace Service of Process Through Email, Text and Social Media

When FTX collapsed, a number of high-profile celebrities, including Larry David, Tom Brady, and Shaquille O’Neal, were swept up in lawsuits alleging they played roles in defrauding investors. O’Neal made headlines because, in addition to being sued, the 7’1” former NBA superstar deftly dodged service of the complaint for months. The lawyers representing investors resorted to tweeting at O’Neal in an effort to get him to accept service, and asked the judge to allow service via social media, to no avail.

Despite being stymied in the FTX case, however, plaintiffs are increasingly finding success convincing courts to allow service of defendants through social media and other digital channels.

What’s Required for Service of Process?

When a lawsuit is filed, the next step is to serve the defendant with a copy of the summons and complaint. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, due process requires that service be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

Historically, that meant serving papers in-person, via mail or, when those means weren’t available, by “alternative” means such as publication in a local newspaper. 

Alternatives Means of Service in the Digital Age

In recent years, there has been a notable shift in the methods permitted by courts for serving lawsuits, reflecting rapid technological advancements and changes in communication preferences. Traditional methods of service, such as personal service or service via mail, have at times proven inadequate or inefficient, especially when dealing with elusive parties. Recognizing the ubiquity of digital communication, many courts allow alternative means of service in appropriate circumstances to ensure justice is not hindered by logistical barriers. 

Thus, many courts have found that service by email satisfies due process in situations where the plaintiff shows that the email is likely to reach the defendant (such as evidence the party has recently used the email address at issue) and that the plaintiff previously engaged in diligent efforts to effectuate traditional service.

Another method is service through social media platforms. Particularly in cases where traditional methods have been exhausted or are impractical, courts have sometimes permitted plaintiffs to serve defendants via platforms like Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn. The rationale is that if a person is actively using a social media account, they are likely to receive and take notice of the message. 

For example, in a copyright infringement lawsuit brought by Sony Music against rapper Trefuego, a Texas district court allowed service on the defendant via direct message on TikTok, Twitter and SoundCloud. The court reasoned:  “Modern problems require modern solutions. And this Court has concerns as to whether SoundCloud and TikTok rapper extraordinaire Trefuego is a regular reader of the Fort Worth Star Telegram or that he regularly visits the information tab of Fort Worth’s city website.”

Text message service has also gained traction. Given that a significant portion of the global population owns a mobile phone and frequently uses it for communication, a lawsuit notification via text can sometimes be more immediate and direct than other methods. 

Challenges Related to Alternative Methods of Service

The technologies that make the convenience of digital service possible also create challenges. One primary concern is the verification of the recipient's identity. For instance, while a social media profile might bear the name and photograph of an individual, there's no guarantee that the person managing or accessing the account is indeed the intended recipient. Multiple people might have access to a single account, or accounts may be impersonated or hacked, leading to potential miscommunication or non-receipt of the lawsuit notice.

Another challenge is ensuring that the delivered message is both seen and understood. Unlike a mailed legal document or a personal service where the receipt is more tangible, digital notifications can get marked as spam or otherwise buried under the mountain of email most of us receive each day.  Such challenges can be partially mitigated by, for instance, using a read receipt feature, securing a response from the party being served, and/or taking screenshots showing the message's delivery and visibility on the recipient's platform. 

Procedural Roadmaps

As alternative service becomes more ubiquitous, more courts are providing parties and their lawyers with clearer roadmaps on how to proceed. For instance, earlier this year, the Illinois Supreme Court announced an amended rule permitting service of summons through electronic means of communication, including email, text messaging, and social media, although traditional methods of service must be attempted first.

In California, there is no rule expressly allowing service of process by email, text messaging, or social media. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(e) provides that service of process on an individual in the United States is to be made pursuant to the laws of the state where the district court is located—so alternative methods may be possible in states such as Illinois that expressly permit such service, provided relevant rules are followed and standards are met. Serving foreign defendants also poses unique challenges. To learn more about serving foreign defendants, you can read our prior posts on that topic here and here.

Conclusion

The fundamental principle underpinning all alternatives methods of service is due process. And the heart of due process is fairness: ensuring that individuals are given proper notice and an opportunity to defend themselves. As technological methods evolve and become more integrated into legal processes, courts will balance efficiency with ensuring that rights are not compromised. Alternative digital service methods must prioritize the principle that individuals deserve a clear, comprehensible, and fair notification when legal action is initiated against them.

And in case you were wondering, Shaquille O’Neal was eventually served in the FTX lawsuit. A process server purchased a ticket to an NBA playoff game and approached O’Neal while he was on the “Inside the NBA” set (O’Neal is an analyst on the show), and delivered the document during the broadcast of the game. Ironically, service was made at the Miami Heat arena, which was formerly called FTX Arena.

For more information regarding Alto Litigation’s litigation practice, please contact one of Alto Litigation’s partners: Bahram Seyedin-Noor, Bryan Ketroser, or Joshua Korr.

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Disclaimer: Materials on this website are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. Transmission of materials and information on this website is not intended to create, and their receipt does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. Although you may send us email or call us, we cannot represent you until we have determined that doing so will not create a conflict of interests. Accordingly, if you choose to communicate with us in connection with a matter in which we do not already represent you, you should not send us confidential or sensitive information, because such communication will not be treated as privileged or confidential. We can only serve as your attorney if both you and we agree, in writing, that we will do so.

The materials on this website are not intended to constitute advertising or solicitation. However, portions of this website may be considered attorney advertising in some states.

Unless otherwise specified, the attorneys listed on this website are admitted to practice in the State of California.